Buyer seller meet 2012 presidential election

The financial markets: Sword of Damocles of the presidential election - OFCE le blog

Apparel Export Promotion Council, India organizes Buyer- Seller meet for of External Affairs Press Release on the U.S. Presidential Election (Nov 7, ). Willard Mitt Romney (born March 12, ) is an American politician and businessman who is He increased a special gasoline retailer fee by two cents per gallon, generating about $60 million per year in additional revenue. Opponents said .. Romney meeting with President Obama after the presidential election. There are new Presidential elections on July 1st, and López cautioned against buying votes, a long-established habit of the PRI. López Obrador published a best-selling book called “Oye, Trump” Elena Poniatowska, the doyenne of Mexican journalism, recalls meeting him when he was a young man.

Jurors similarly owe society at large, or perhaps more specifically the defendant, duties to 1 try to determine the truth, and 2 do so in an informed and rational way.

buyer seller meet 2012 presidential election

The doctors, parents, and jurors are fiduciaries of others. They owe a duty of care, and this duty of care brings with it certain epistemic responsibilities. One might try to argue that voters owe similar duties of care to the governed. Perhaps voters should vote 1 for what they perceive to be the best outcomes consistent with strategic voting and 2 make such decisions in a sufficiently informed and rational way.

How voters vote has significant impact on political outcomes, and can help determine matters of peace and war, life and death, prosperity and poverty. Majority voters do not just choose for themselves, but for everyone, including dissenting minorities, children, non-voters, resident aliens, and people in other countries affected by their decisions. For this reason, voting seems to be a morally charged activity Christiano ; Brennan a; Beerbohm That said, one clear disanalogy between the relationship doctors have with patients and voters have with the governed is that individual voters have only a vanishingly small chance of making a difference.

The expected harm of an incompetent individual vote is vanishingly small, while the expected harm of incompetent individual medical decisions is high. However, perhaps the point holds anyway. It's plausible that one might have an obligation to refrain from participating in such activities, i. To illustrate, Suppose a member firing squad is about to shoot an innocent child. Each bullet will hit the child at the same time, and each shot would, on its own, be sufficient to kill her.

You cannot stop them, so the child will die regardless of what you do. Now, suppose they offer you the opportunity to join in and shoot the child with them. You can make the st shot. Again, the child will die regardless of what you do.

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Is it permissible for you join the firing squad? Most people have a strong intuition that it is wrong to join the squad and shoot the child. One plausible explanation of why it is wrong is that there may be a general moral prohibition against participating in these kinds of activities. In these kinds of cases, we should try to keep our hands clean.

The firing-squad example is somewhat analogous to voting in an election. Adding or subtracting a shooter to the firing squad makes no difference—the girl will die anyway. Similarly, with elections, individual votes make no difference. In both cases, the outcome is causally overdetermined. Still, the irresponsible voter is much like a person who volunteers to shoot in the firing squad.

Her individual bad vote is of no consequence—just as an individual shot is of no consequence—but she is participating in a collectively harmful activity when she could easily keep her hands clean Brennan a, 68— The Justice of Compulsory Voting Voting rates in many contemporary democracies are according to many observers low, and seem in general to be falling.

Many other countries have similarly low rates. Some democratic theorists, politicians, and others think this is problematic, and advocate compulsory voting as a solution. In a compulsory voting regime, citizens are required to vote by law; if they fail to vote without a valid excuse, they incur some sort of penalty.

One major argument for compulsory voting is what we might call the Demographic or Representativeness Argument Lijphart ; Engelen ; Galston ; Hill in J. Brennan and Hill The argument begins by noting that in voluntary voting regimes, citizens who choose to vote are systematically different from those who choose to abstain. The rich are more likely to vote than the poor. The old are more likely to vote than the young. Men are more likely to vote than women.

In many countries, ethnic minorities are less likely to vote than ethnic majorities. More highly educated people are more likely to vote than less highly educated people. Married people are more likely to vote than non-married people. Political partisans are more likely to vote than true independents Leighley and Nagler ; Evans In short, under voluntary voting, the electorate—the citizens who actually choose to vote—are not fully representative of the public at large.

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The Demographic Argument holds that since politicians tend to give voters what they want, in a voluntary voting regime, politicians will tend to advance the interests of advantaged citizens who vote disproportionately over the disadvantaged who tend not to vote. The thought here is that an individual voter realizes her individual vote has little significance.

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However, she cannot easily coordinate with other voters and ensure they will vote with her. Compulsory voting solves this problem. For this reason, Lisa Hill First, political scientists overwhelmingly find that voters do not vote their self-interest, but instead vote for what they perceive to be the national interest.

See the dozens of papers cited at Brennan and Hill Second, it might turn out that disadvantaged citizens are not informed enough to vote in ways that promote their interests—they might not have sufficient social scientific knowledge to know which candidates or political parties will help them Delli Carpini and Keeter ; Caplan ; Somin Third, it may be that even in a compulsory voting regime, politicians can get away with ignoring the policy preferences of most voters Gilens ; Bartels Political scientists have also been unable to demonstrate that compulsory voting leads to more egalitarian or left-leaning policy outcomes.

The Ethics of Vote Buying Many citizens of modern democracies believe that vote buying and selling are immoral Tetlock Many philosophers agree; they argue it is wrong to buy, trade, or sell votes Satz Richard Hasen reviews the literature on vote buying and concludes that people have offered three main arguments against it.

He says, Despite the almost universal condemnation of core vote buying, commentators disagree on the underlying rationales for its prohibition. Some offer an equality argument against vote buying: Others offer an efficiency argument against vote buying: Finally, some commentators offer an inalienability argument against vote buying: This alienability argument may support an anti-commodification norm that causes voters to make public-regarding voting decisions.

However, whether vote buying is destructive is a subject of serious social scientific debate; some economists think markets in votes would in fact produce greater efficiency Buchanan and Tullock ; Haefele ; Mueller ; Philipson and Snyder ; Hasen The third concern is deontological: Many people think vote selling is wrong because it would lead to bad or corrupt voting.

But, if that is the problem, then perhaps the permissibility of vote buying and selling should be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Perhaps the rightness or wrongness of individual acts of vote buying and selling depends entirely on how the vote seller votes J. Suppose I pay a person to vote in a good way.

For instance, suppose I pay indifferent people to vote on behalf of women's rights, or for the Correct Theory of Justice, whatever that might be. Or, suppose I think turnout is too low, and so I pay a well-informed person to vote her conscience. It is unclear why we should conclude in either case that I have done something wrong, rather than conclude that I have done everyone a small public service.

Certain objections to vote buying and selling appear to prove too much; these objections lead to conclusions that the objectors are not willing to support. For instance, one common argument against voting selling is that paying a person to vote imposes an externality on third parties. However, so does persuading others to vote or to vote in certain ways Freiman If paying you to vote for X is wrong because it imposes a third party cost, then for the sake of consistency, I should also conclude that persuading you to vote for X, say, on the basis of a good argument, is equally problematic.

As another example, some object to voting markets on the grounds that votes should be for the common good, rather than for narrow self-interest Satz Some claim that vote markets should be illegal for this reason. However, if that is sufficient reason to forbid markets in votes, then it is unclear why we should not, e. Further these arguments appear to leave open that a person could permissibly sell her vote, provided she does so after deliberating and provided she votes for the common good.

It might be that if vote selling were legal, most or even all vote sellers would vote in destructive ways, but that does not show that vote selling is inherently wrong.

Who Should Be Allowed to Vote? This view has recently come under criticism, though, both from friends and foes of democracy. Call this the boundary problem or the problem of constituting the demos Goodin Democracy is the rule of the people. This is no small problem. There are a number of competing theories here. The basic argument is that anyone who is affected by a political decision-making process should have some say over that process.

However, this principle suffers from multiple problems. It may be incoherent or useless, as we might not know or be able to know who is affected by a decision until after the decision is made Goodin For example taken from Goodin We cannot assess whether the members of the former African colonies are among the affected interests until we know what the outcome of the vote is. If the vote is yay, then they are affected; if the vote is nay, then they are not. See Owen for a response.

Sometimes political decisions made in one country have a significant effect on citizens of another country; sometimes political decisions made in one country have little or no effect on some of the citizens of that country.

One solution Goodin This principle implies, however, that for many decisions, the demos is smaller than the nation-state, and for others, it is larger. For instance, when the United States decides whether to elect a warmongering or pacifist candidate, this affects not only Americans, but a large percentage of people worldwide.

Other major theories offered as solutions to the boundary problem face similar problems. Further, who will be coerced depends on the outcome of a decision.

buyer seller meet 2012 presidential election

If a state decides to impose some laws, it will coerce certain people, and if the state declines to impose those laws, then it will not. The commonsense view of the demos, i. This may be an accidental feature of arbitrarily-decided national borders, but once these borders are in place, citizens will find that their interests tend to more linked together than with citizens of other polities.

But whether this is true is also highly contingent. In many decisions, many citizens have little to nothing at stake, while other citizens have a great deal at stake. Otherwise, in a system of one person, one vote, issues that are deeply important to the few might continually lose out to issues of only minor interest to the many Brighouse and Fleurbaey There are a number of other independent arguments for this conclusion.

Further, though the argument for this conclusion is too technical to cover here in depth Brighouse and Fleurbaey ; Listit may be that apportioning political power according to one's stake in the outcome can overcome some of the well-known paradoxes of democracy, such as the Condorcet Paradox which show that democracies might have intransitive preferences, i.

Those who yelled at him and slammed their doors in his face merely reinforced his resolve. Nixon and later was appointed to the Nixon cabinet. Mitt's mother Lenore, promoted here on a button, lost a Senate race in Mitt worked for her campaign.

In Junehe was in southern France and driving an automobile that was hit by another vehicle, which seriously injured him and killed one of his passengers, the wife of the mission president. Upon his return, he was surprised to learn that his father had joined that same movement during his unsuccessful presidential campaign.

In a June newspaper profile of children of cabinet members, Mitt said that U. He later sought and received two additional student deferments. Benjamin and Craig were born after Romney had begun his career. Business career of Mitt Romney Management consulting Recruited by several firms inRomney joined the Boston Consulting Group BCGreasoning that working as a management consultant for a variety of companies would better prepare him for a future position as a chief executive.

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The candidates of the two major parties both advocate the need to restore a balanced budget. But this is not the heart of the matter. What is striking, beyond the need to reduce public deficits in the euro zone countries, is the fact that our destinies are inextricably linked. As is shown by the graph on changes in bond yields in the euro zone Figure 2when the euro zone is weakened, all the countries suffer an impact on their risk premium relative to the United States and the United Kingdom, although to varying degrees.

This construction is taking place, but it is far from complete: The buyer of the CDS pays the seller the agreed amounts at regular intervals, until maturity of the CDS or the occurrence of the credit event. The swap is then unwound, either by delivery of the underlying instrument, or in cash.

If the contract terms provide for physical settlement, the buyer of the CDS delivers the bonds to the seller in exchange for their nominal value. The annual premium that the bank will pay to the insurance company for the right to coverage is called the CDS spread and constitutes the value listed on the market: In reality, as the banks are both the buyers and sellers of protection, the spread is usually presented as a range: It is thus ready to buy protection against the risk of default by paying 90 basis points on the principal but it demands to provide that protection.

To illustrate this, consider the following example.